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3

ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether the lower court erred in not finding the
actions of Midvale City arbitrary and capricious in revoking permanently the business license of appellant
according to the facts presented.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal of a

denial of a petition for an Extraordinary Writ pursuant to
Rule 65(B).

Appellant's license to sell beer was permanently

revoked by the Midvale City Council after a finding that an
employee of appellant had allowed minors in a tavern.
B.

Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On the 26th

day of June, 1984, a hearing was held before the Midvale City
Council, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause.

Evidence was

heard and appellant, through counsel, produced witnesses,
testified himself, and cross examined the city's witnesses.
On the 11th day of July the City entered an order, accompanied
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, permanently revoking appellant's Class "C" beer license.

On that day an

amended petition for Extraordinary Writ was filed in the
Third Judicial District Court, appealing the decision.

(The

original petition was amended to reflect the fact that the
City had filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
Order.

The original petition was filed before the findings

were made because of the threat of criminal prosecution by
the City, communicated to appellant through counsel, should
he remain open for business, in spite of the absence of
formal findings.)

2

Appellant
:*-•;*-,
.ictTui

filed

^u-ines': <, -<-_

A/OUIJ

an a f f i d a v i t

-;-d d i i e ^ '

...

; *" * v- ' * i

i temporary

?ran^e '

Juda,e Conder e r a n t p d

pendency

*

ne

reflecting

denied

hearH

..

.r^n

«as

- itrer~

, , c .

of

i-« •

<...u<-

• • n^i

order,

which

v:i~ u e l u un

.-

JSLOT^

n

n

of F a c t s .

Responded

-----n--

etltjon

• ' au

-

^

in--

was

an <*ri:er

r^r[e
T

w: - i r e s o e c

charge

.vn^

*:•

uI

- - l i a r :i t:,

the circumstances

' •> ^
underlying

it*

this

" ^r a L Lowing m a n o r s

Revised Oruinir-

unne S h a r o n xvas c i : ^

:\v

'hur

- of
:

r

individuals.

i.smissec.

-n^ ^ - T<e of b o t h v i o l a t i o n s
.J

anneaj. wd& t a ^ e n

Jure ".

.'icvale

^

This

Thr> f ^ c t s

. ^:..^r

le u i . i e r

employu -

"^aof

Statement

same v i o l a t i o n

,\r

^^^

g r a n t e d a st-a"

.-_
t:ie

m g ^. ; e r was

rh*. r e s t r a i n i n g

^ u jeeL-Lurib w e r e d e n i e d .

an,; . . u j g e w . ^ ; ^ i

Charcn

"" n -ai.au i e

r c t -,e p r o p o s e d on.le r an;: th< > se o r, j ec t: i o n s we r e

-i~d r^**-

C.

l

financial

action.

-indinp^ -f

o h i ec t i o n s

md

rejr.;

!>

t h e pe1 . - L .

his

h in^<

: ; o r k i n g a t Car o l

surrounding

3

the f i r s t

'" 1o qr -n was an
.. _

incident

,
(See

Because

testimony of Junne Charon, City Council hearing pp.
no action was taken by appellant against Ms. Charon.

),
Immed-

iately upon the occurrence of the second incident, Ms. Charon
was fired (Ibid, p

).

The fact of the violations was not contested at the
hearing before the City Council.

Appellant testified that

upon hiring employees he sat down with them and informed them
of work rules regarding identification, gambling, and serving
beer. (See testimony of Dave Rivas, city council hearing
pp.

). This was confirmed by Junne Charon (pp

4

)

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS WERE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
A.

THE FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO MAKE FINDINGS
WITH RESPECT TO UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY OFFERED BY
APPELLANT IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

Due process naturally requires that the licensee be
entitled to notice and a hearing, and appellant should be
afforded the opportunity to present evidence, which he did.
Additionally, a record must be made so that judicial review is
possible.

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake

County, Utah, 555 P.2d 281 (1976).

This review is especially

important since a city council is not law-trained and quasijudicial functions are the exception rather than the rule in
municipal functions.
Taking the foregoing as true, it certainly follows
that the hearing must be a meaningful one in the sense that
all testimony adduced must at least be considered by the
governing body.

And if testimony is undisputed, and relevant,

as is certainly the case with respect to the referred to testimony by Mr. Rivas and Ms. Charon, the Findings of Fact must at
least recite those facts which are undisputed and relevant.
Certainly if findings are necessary (Anderson v. Utah County
Board of County Commissioners,

Utah 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979),
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then to give this requirement meaning, the findings must
comport with the evidence.
The findings in this case completely ignore the undisputed, relevant testimony of the appellant's witnesses and
merely recite the allegations contained in the Order to Show
Cause in conclusory fashion.

Where the inferior tribunal

below ignored these facts, this court should find such action
to be arbitrary and capricious.
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
IN MAKING NO FINDINGS CONCERNING APPELLANT'S
PROPERTY INTEREST.

In the hearing before the City Council, appellant,
Rivas testified concerning his

ownership of the business

known as Carol's Lounge, the length of such ownership and the
efforts he had made to comply himself, and assure that his
employees comply with applicable ordinances and statutes
concerning his business.

In the petition filed in Third

District Court, appellant executed an affidavit specifying his
monetary interest in the business.

Yet neither in the findings

before the council, nor the findings in Third District Court
is there any showing that the appellant's property interest was
considered.

This court has held that

A city has broad discretion in granting,
denying or revoking beer licenses, but a
business enterprise may not be deprived of
a license without due concern for the
property interest involved. Anderson v.
Utah Board of County Commissioners , 589~~

P72d m^TCUtah 1979):

Obviously where this matter is not addressed by
either the tribunal or the lower court it cannot be said that
the matter was given

,f

due concern".

And if due concern was

not given to the issue by respondent, its actions were
arbitrary and capricious,
C.

THE PENALTY OF PERMANENT REVOCATION OF
APPELLANT'S LICENSE IS, IN AND OF ITSELF,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

There is no question that cities have broad authority
in regulating licensees.
(Utah 1980).

Whiting vs. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362

This discretion is not unbridled however.

As

has been pointed out, the respondent must take into account the
property interest one has in his business.

If that is so it

seems to follow that the tribunal must balance that substantial
interest, and the penalty that a forfeiture would entail,
against the severity of the violation and the culpability of the
appellant.

Said in another way, to give effect to this court's

pronouncements, the punishment should fit the crime.
In this particular case the appellant's testified as to
the inadvertent nature of the violations, the habit or custom
with respect to normal enforcement procedures, and the unique
circumstances surrounding the violations.

It should be noted

that in this area, bar operators like the appellant are required
to play an enforcement role with respect to city ordinances.
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They are dealing with an area that involves others who may be
intent on breaking the law themselves. In such circumstances
the tribunal should be extremely reluctant to take away
someones livelihood on a permanent basis, absent flagrant
violations.
CONCLUSION
The tribunal below clearly abused its discretion and
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by permanently revoking
appellant's license and hence destroying his livelihood, based
upon the record below.

The respondent failed to make findings

concerning relevant, undisputed testimony adduced before it.
Respondent failed to even acknowledge, let alone show Mdue
concern" for the property interest of appellant, contrary to
this court's rulings in Whiting and Anderson.

The lower court

erred in denying the petition for extraordinary writ.

The

lower court's order should be reversed and the Respondent's
order of revocation should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted

MARK A. BESENDORFER
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